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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After being convicted of felony possession of sexually exploitative material, John
Meier filed a motion for the return of property that was taken as a result of a probation
search. The property at issue was unrelated to the charge that Mr. Meier pleaded guilty
to; and, as part of the plea agreement, the State waived the right to bring any charges
related to the property, which the State believed to have been stolen. After holding a
hearing and receiving affidavits from loss prevention officers claiming the property was
stolen from various stores, the district court denied Mr. Meier's motion for the return of
his property. Mr. Meier timely appeals from the district court's denial of his motion for
the return of his property.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinns
Police were investigating John Meier on allegations that he was involved in thefts
from local businesses. (12/8/06 ~ r . ' ,p.6, L.10 - p.7, L.17.) As part of that investigation,
police searched a storage unit rented by Mr. Meier pursuant to a condition of his
probation that waived his Fourth Amendment rights against searches. (12/8/06 Tr., p.6,
Ls.20-23; 4/24/08 Tr., p.39, L.22 - p.40, L.7.) Inside the storage unit, police found a
In this case, the ldaho Supreme Court has entered an order taking judicial notice of
the underlying record in ldaho Supreme Court Case No. 34261, Sfafe v. Meier. (35555
R., pp.6-7.) Because there are multiple transcripts of proceedings, both in ldaho
Supreme Court Case No. 34261 and in ldaho Supreme Court Case No. 35555, citations
made to the transcripts of proceedings are made herein with reference to the date on
which the proceedings occurred. Additionally, citations to the clerk's record will be
made with reference to the ldaho Supreme Court case number under which the clerk's
record was prepared.

briefcase that contained numerous pictures of children that were partially undressed
and that appeared to be engaged in sexual activities. (I218106 Tr., p.7, L.18 - p.8, L.13;
p.22, L.6 - p.23, L.20.) They also obtained a home movie showing Mr. Meier engaging
in sexual acts with a young boy, and other video footage of naked children. (1218106
Tr., p.17, L.1 - p.21, L.9.) The search also apparently uncovered numerous items that
the State believed were stolen property, which were also seized. (34261 R., pp.58-79.)
Mr. Meier was charged with three counts of felony possession of sexually
exploitative material. (R., pp.21-22.) The State subsequently filed a second information
alleging that Mr. Meier was a persistent violator and requesting sentencing as such
under IC § 19-2514. (R., pp.27-28.) Mr. Meier was never charged with any theft
offense based upon the other items recovered from the storage unit. (34261 R., pp.6-7,
13-14, 21-22, 27-28.)
d to one charge of felony possession of
Mr. Meier pleaded guilty via an ~ l f o r plea
sexually exploitative material and to his status as a persistent violator. (316107 Tr., p.9,
L.15 - p.13, L.l; R., pp.45-46.) As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed not to
pursue any charges relating to grand thefi or forgery, nor was Mr. Meier obligated to pay
any restitution for any items that were not a part of the charges that Mr. Meier was
pleading guilty to. (316107 Tr., p.5, Ls. 19-24; 11129107 Tr., p.10, Ls.14-16.) Specifically,
"in exchange for [Mr. Meier's] guilty plea, the State is not going to file any grand theft
charges or additional charges against him for crimes allegedly committed against Home

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), permits a defendant to enter a guilty plea
to the charged offense despite maintaining his or her innocence of the crime.

Depot or

owe's."^ (316107 Tr., p.5, Ls.9-13.) (emphasis added.) But the State was free

to make any sentencing recommendation to the court. (316107 Tr., p.6, Ls.11-18.)
The district court imposed a fixed life sentence. (511107 Tr., p.33, L.21

- p.35,

L.9; R., pp.45-46.) Mr. Meier timely appealed and challenged the sentence executed by
the district court.
While the direct appeal of his sentence was pending, Mr. Meier filed a motion for
the release of property pursuant to I.C.R. 41.1, along with an itemized list of the
property that he was requesting that the State return. (34261 R., pp.52-79.) The State
objected to Mr. Meier's motion, and provided an unsworn account of the underlying
circumstances of the original search, which was apparently a search conducted
pursuant to a Fourth Amendment waiver that was part of Mr. Meier's probation
agreement. (35555 R., pp.12-18.) The State alleged that the property Mr. Meier was
seeking was stolen, and that Mr. Meier had waived the right to assert any interest in this
property as part of the plea agreement. (35555 R., p. 17.)
At the hearing on Mr. Meier's motion, the district court articulated its belief that
Mr. Meier bore the burden of establishing that he was the rightful owner of the property
that he was seeking, although the court did note that there was a prima facie factual
indication of his possessory interest because the property was in his possession at the
time it was taken by the State. (4124108 Tr., p.7, Ls.7-17.) Mr. Meier testified that he
had rented the storage unit where the property was taken from, and that all of the
property taken was his. (4/24108Tr., p.9, L.22-p.10, L.16, p.11, Ls.3-5, p.18, L.23-

This Court may wish to note that, since there was never any complaint or information
charging Mr. Meier with a theft offense, there does not appear to be any legal allegation
that this theft occurred. (34261 R., pp.6-713-14,21-22, 27-28.)

p.19, L.9.) He further explained that he was employed in the construction trade, and
also installed car stereos, and that the items taken were personal tools that he used in
his employment. (4124108 Tr., p.1I , L.23 - p.12, L.25.)
The district court asked the State whether there was ever a warrant issued in
support of the initial search of Mr. Meier's storage locker from which the property at
issue was seized. (4124108 Tr., p.39, L.22

- p.40, L.4.)

The State conceded that there

was no warrant and that the search was conducted pursuant to Mr. Meier's Fourth
Amendment waiver that was part of the terms and conditions of his probation. (4124108
Tr., p.40, Ls.5-7.)
The district court then asked the prosecutor for the basis for the State's assertion
that the items listed on the police inventory were stolen. (4124108 Tr., p.41, Ls.3-6.)
The State admitted that it did not have evidence in the record at that time, but proffered
what the prosecutor believed that she could show at a later time. (4124108 Tr., p.41,
Ls.7-10.) This included that two other people believed to have been involved in the
alleged theft were ordered to pay restitution, there was a videotape of "people coming
and going" who were alleged to have used receipts to return stolen property in
exchange for money, and loss prevention officers from the stores identified the property
as coming from their stores. (4124108 Tr., p.41, L.1I- p.42, L.1.)
The State also argued that, when it waived the right to bring any charges related
to the alleged thefts, Mr. Meier had somehow admitted that the property was stolen or
otherwise waived a claim of ownership to this property. (4/24/08 Tr., p.42, L.3 - p.43,
L.3.) The district court disagreed and found that Mr. Meier made no waiver of a claim to
the property as a part of his plea. (4124108 Tr., p.43, L.4 - p.44, L.15,p.53, Ls.21-25.)

Given that the State did not have evidence at the time of the hearing to support
its assertion that the property at issue was stolen, the district court continued the matter
in order to give the State the opportunity to provide that evidence. (4124108 Tr., p.54,
L.21 - p.55, L.7.) The court also indicated that it would provide Mr. Meier time to
respond to the State's evidence once it was submitted. (4124108 Tr., p.57, Ls.2-3.)
The State filed with the district court affidavits from loss prevention officers from
Home Depot, Lowes, and Builder's Lighting. (Affidavit of Josh Toulouse, pp.1-15;
Affidavit of Victor Rodriguez, pp.1-7; and Affidavit of Stewart Reynolds, pp.1-3;
A~gment.~)The substance of these affidavits is virtually identical. Each contains a
recitation of the name of the affiant, his affiliation with a store, that the affiant was
contacted by the Boise Police Department, and that the affiant visually inspected and
identified various items of property listed on the attached police inventory list as being
stolen from their store as part of a refund scheme. (Affidavit of Josh Toulouse, pp.1-15;
Affidavit of Victor Rodriguez, pp.1-7; and Affidavit of Stewart Reynolds, pp.1-3.) None
of the affidavits provides information regarding how the affiants determined that the
property visually inspected and listed on the invoice sheet was the property of their
store, or what information supported the affiants' conclusions that the property was
stolen. (Affidavit of Josh Toulouse, pp.1-15; Affidavit of Victor Rodriguez, pp.1-7; and
Affidavit of Stewart Reynolds, pp.1-3.)

Mr. Meier has sought to augment the record on appeal in this case with the affidavits
of Josh Toulouse, Victor Rodriguez, and Stewart Reynolds though a motion to augment
that is filed concurrently with Mr. Meier's Appellant's Brief. For ease of reference, the
pages of the affidavits and attached invoices have been hand-numbered consecutively.

After the State submitted affidavits from the affiants employed by Lowes, Home
Depot, and Builder's Lighting, Mr. Meier filed a response in which he asserted that these
affidavits were conclusory and that they did not offer specific facts in support of the
conclusion that the items were stolen from these stores. (35555 R., p.21.) Mr. Meier
also requested an order from the district court for production of several receipts from
these stores which indicated many of the items of property in dispute may have been
purchased. (35555 R., pp.21-23.) He requested copies of these receipts in order to
provide further proof that he was the rightful owner of the property. (35555 R., pp.2123.) The State responded that the affidavits were not conclusory because each of the
affiants swore that they visually inspected the property at issue and identified them as
stolen. (35555 R., pp.26-27.)
The district court denied Mr. Meier's motion for the return of his property. (35555
R., pp.29-31.) The court found that, after reviewing Mr. Meier's testimony and affidavit,

and the affidavits of the loss prevention officers provided by the State, the true owners
of the property were Lowes, Home Depot, and Builder's Lighting. (35555 R., p.30.)
Although one of the affidavits of the loss prevention officers omitted a claim of
ownership to several items of property listed on the police invoices, the district court
found that this was an inadvertent omission. (35555 R., p.30.) As a component of this
finding, the district court found that Mr. Toulouse had referenced three pages of
inventory and "[tlhere were actually 34 items listed on the final three pages," as
opposed to the 29 items that were listed in the affidavit of Josh Toulouse. (35555 R.,
p.30.)

In reality, there were four additional pages attached to the affidavit of Josh

Toulouse, three of which indicated 29 items and one of which listed five. (Affidavit of

Josh Toulouse, pp.12-15.) Based on the district court's erroneous calculation of the
number of pages attached to Mr. Toulouse's affidavit, the court excused the State from
any obligation to provide additional evidence regarding the ownership of the omitted
items because the court found that the reference to three additional pages would
subsume all of the items on the attached police inventory. (35555 R., pp.30-31.)
Mr. Meier timely appeals from the district court's order denying his motion for the
return of his property.

ISSUE

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Meier's motion for the return
of his property?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Meier's Motion For The
Return Of His Property
A.

Introduction
ldaho Criminal Rule 41(e) applies to a defendant's motion for the return of

property that has been taken by the State as the result of a search and seizure. While
no case law in ldaho delineates the burdens of proof for such actions and other
applicable legal standards for I.C.R. 41(e), case law interpreting the federal counterpart
to this rule makes clear that, when no charges are pending regarding the property at
issue, the burden is on the State to demonstrate that the movant is not entitled to the
property. The district court in this case improperly shiffed the burden to Mr. Meier, and
therefore abused its discretion.
Additionally, the evidence provided by the State in the form of affidavits was too
conclusory to be of evidentiary value in determining the ultimate issue of ownership of,
and entitlement to, the property in dispute. As such, the district court's finding that, "the
various stores are the true owners of the personal property based upon the affidavits of
the loss prevention officers," was clearly erroneous because it was not supported by
substantial and competent evidence.
Finally, the district court abused its discretion when it relieved the State of its
evidentiary burden of proving that Mr. Meier was not entitled to five items of property
that were omitted in their entirety from any claim of ownership in the affidavits.

B.

Applicable Law
As an initial matter, there appears to have been some confusion in the underlying

proceedings in this case as to which statute or court rule governs the nature of the
proceedings where a defendant seeks the return of property that was seized by the
State in the course of a criminal investigation. While the district court relied, in part, on
the provisions of I.C. § 19-3801 and I.C. § 19-3807, a review of the text of these
statutes demonstrates that they are not applicable under the facts of this case.
(11/29/07 Tr., p.5,Ls.18-22; 35555 R., p.29.) ldaho Code § 19-3801 only applies to
cases where there is an information or charge that has been filed in connection with the
property. I.C. § 19-3801. And ldaho Code

19-3807 only applies to cases in which the

defendant has been convicted of a felony and the evidence is contraband. I.C.

19-

3807. Neither predicate circumstance is present in this case. Moreover, a review of the
chapter in which these statutes are situated indicates that these statutes apply where
there has been a specific allegation that the defendant has committed theft offense.
See I.C.

19-3801

- 3807.

As has been noted, Mr. Meier has never been charged

with a theft offense, and the State has waived the right to ever bring such an allegation
against Mr. Meier as part of the plea agreement in this case. (316107 Tr., p.5, Ls.9-13;
34261 R., pp.6-7, 13-14, 21-22, 27-28.) Therefore, to the extent that the district court
was acting in reliance on these provisions, the district court's reliance was misplaced.
Mr. Meier's motion for the return of his property was brought under the rubric of
I.C.R. 41.1.

(34261 R., p.56.) The State addressed Mr. Meier's contentions as a

motion for return of property under I.C.R. 41(e). (35555 R., p.15.) However, this Court
has recognized that, with regards to motions, it is the substance of the relief sought, and

not the label attached to the motion, that controls the analysis. See, e.g., Howard v.
FMC Corp., 98 ldaho 465, 471, 567 P.2d 10, 16 (1977) (the title of a legal document is
not controlling as to its legal effect); Anderson v. Springer, 78 ldaho 17, 22, 296 P.2d
1024, 1027 (1956) (the character of a pleading is determined by its contents and not by
the name by which it is called); Ade v. Baffen, 126 ldaho 114, 116 n.1, 878 P.2d 813,
815 (Ct. App. 1994). In this case, it is apparent that, given the nature of Mr. Meier's
request for relief, ldaho Criminal Rule 41(e) would apply.
ldaho Criminal Rule 41.1 deals with the return of exhibits, and its provisions deal
with reclaiming exhibits offered or admitted into evidence in connection with a criminal
action that has been commenced by the State. I.C.R. 41.1. Again, no criminal action
was ever commenced against Mr. Meier in connection with the property at issue in this
appeal. However, ldaho Criminal Rule 41(e) applies where the party seeking the return
of the property is a party aggrieved by a search and seizure undertaken by the State.
I.C.R. 41(e). This is the set of circumstances under which Mr. Meier sought the return
of his property. As such, the provisions of I.C.R. 41(e) apply to the district court's
decision to deny Mr. Meier's motion for the return of his property.
C.

Under Applicable Leaal Standards. The District Court's Denial Of Mr. Meier's
Motion For The Return Of His Propertv Was An Abuse Of Discretion
There does not appear to be case law in ldaho specifically discussing the

burdens of proof and applicable legal standards when a defendant seeks the return of
property that was seized pursuant to a criminal investigation on a charge that was either

never filed or was subsequently di~missed.~
However, because ldaho Criminal Rule
41(e) is substantially the same as Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g), federal
cases discussing this provision provide substantial guidance for this court6 See, e.g.,
Campbell v. Kildew, 141 ldaho 640, 646, 115 P.3d 731, 737 (2005); State v. Carrasco,
117 ldaho 295,298,787 P.2d 281,284 (1990).
"A district court has jurisdiction to entertain motions to return property seized by
the government when there are no criminal proceedings pending against the movant."
U.S. v. Mattinson, 809 F.2d 1364, 1366-1367 (gthCir. 1987). The district court findings
of fact pursuant to a Rule 41(e) motion are reviewed for clear error, and the court's legal
conciusions are reviewed de novo. Butler Trailer Manufacturing v. State, 132 ldaho
687, 691, 978 P.2d 247, 251 (Ct. App. 1999); U.S.

V.

VanHorn, 296 F.3d 713, 719 (8th

Cir. 2002). Denial of a Rule 41(e) motion is generally proper where the defendant is not

The only decision that appellate counsel was able to locate regarding a defendant's
motion for return of property under I.C.R. 41(e) deals primarily with the issue of whether
there was sufficient evidence to support the district court's finding that the items
requested in the motion for return of property were not actually taken by the State. See
Butler Trailer Manufacturing v. State, 132 ldaho 687, 691-692, 978 P.2d 247, 251-252
(Ct. App. 'i999). This opinion does not set forth the applicable legal standards for such
motions outside of the context of its holding regarding the necessity of the district court
to make a determination of what was seized by the State and noting the fact that a
police inventory is important evidence in making this determination. Id. However, there
is no dispute that the police seized the items listed on the police inventory, and
therefore the ultimate holding in Butler Trailer Manufacturing does not appear to be of
assistance in the resolution of the issues in this appeal.
On December 1, 2002, F.R.Cr.P. 41(e) was redesignated as F.R.Cr.P. 41(g). See
Jackson v. U.S., 526 F.3d 394, 396 n.1 (8th Cir. 2008). However, this renumbering did
not alter the substance of the rule. Id. Therefore, some of the federal case law
discussing this provision of the federal rules references F.R.Cr.P. 41(e), rather than
F.R.Cr.P. 41(g), where the motion for return of property was filed prior to the
renumbering of the rule in 2002.

lawfully entitled to the property, the property is contraband, or if the government's need
of the property as evidence in an ongoing case continues. VanHorn, 296 F.3d at 719.
The relative burden of proof on the parties depends on the procedural posture of
the case. Marfinson, 809 F.2d at 1369. Specifically, whether the defendant or the State
bears the burden of establishing a right to possession of the property depends upon the
status of the underlying criminal allegations that purport to justify the State's seizure of
the property. If the motion for the return of property is filed while a criminal investigation
is pending, the movant bears the burden of proving that the seizure of the property was
illegal and that he or she is entitled to legal possession of the property. Id. However,
when the property in question is no longer needed for evidentiary purposes, either
because trial is complete, the defendant has pleaded guilty, or the State has abandoned
the charges and investigation, then the burden of proof shifts. Id. "The person from
whom the property is seized is presumed to have the right to its return, and the
government has the burden of demonstrating that it has a legitimate reason to detain
the property." Id; see also U.S. v. Potes Ramirez, 260 F.3d 1310 ( l l t h Cir. 2001);
U.S. v. Chambers, 192 F.3d 374, 377 (3@Cir. 1999).

Part of the State's burden

includes providing evidence that establishes that the property in dispute is contraband
or the fruit of illegal activity. Marfinson, 809 F.2d at 1370; see also Merlington v. State,
839 N.E.2d 260, 263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). The seizure of property from a person is
prima facie evidence of that person's ownership of and entitlement to the property.
U.S. v. Wright, 610 F.2d 930, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

The district court in this case improperly shifted the initial burden of proof onto
Mr. Meier. While the district court noted that the fact that the State had taken items

from Mr. Meier's possession constituted prima facie evidence of his interest in the
property, the court incorrectly believed that the burden was on Mr. Meier to establish
that, "he is entitled to lawful possession of certain property that is in the custody of the
state." (4124108 Tr., p.7, Ls.7-17.) Because the State had elected to not bring any
charges against Mr. Meier regarding the property at issue in this appeal, and had
waived the right to bring any such charges in the future against Mr. Meier, the State
bore the initial burden of proof in this case. Marfinson, 809 F.2d at 1369-1370.
Additionally, there was insufficient evidence submitted to the district court that the
property at issue in this case was actually stolen by Mr. Meier. A district court judge
may not rely merely on the representations of the State regarding a material issue
bearing on a motion for the return of property, but must instead rely on the evidence
presented. Mora v. U.S., 955 F.2d 156, 158 (2"d Cir. 1992). This is reflected in the
language of I.C.R. 41(e), which provides that, "The court shall receive evidence on any
issue necessary to the decision on the motion." I.C.R. 41(e). In light of the requirement
that the State present evidence in support of its contentions that the property should not
be returned to the defendant, or that the property does not belong to the defendant, the
prosecution's representations to the district court regarding suspicions that Mr. Meier
had stolen the property are not a legitimate basis to support the district court's ruling in
this case.
The remaining evidence is also insufficient to support the district court's ruling
that "the various stores are the true owners of the personal property based upon the
affidavits of the loss prevention officers." (35555 R., p.30.) Information contained in an
affidavit may be inadequate for evidentiary purposes if the affidavit is conclusory. See,

e.g., State V. Johnson, 110 ldaho 516, 527, 716 P.2d 1288,1299 (1986); Posey v. Ford
Motor Credit Co., 141 ldaho 477, 483, 111 P.3d 162, 168 (Ct. App. 2005); Bickerstaff v.
Vassar College, 196 F.3d 435 (2"d Cir. 1999). And an affidavit is merely conclusory if it
contains bare allegations with no indication of the affiant's factual basis for the
allegation or conclusion. Johnson, 110 ldaho at 527, 716 P.2d at 1299. The district
court may not base its decision solely on conclusory affidavits, because doing so
constitutes a "mere ratification of the bare conciusions of others." Illinois v. Gates, 462

U.S. 213, 239 (1983). Instead, an affidavit must include concrete particulars in support
of the conclusions contained within it. See, e.g., Bickersfaff, 196 F.3d at 451-452. An
affidavit that lacks such particulars cannot even create a genuine issue of material fact
in an action, much less carry the full evidentiary burden in a case. See Id.
For example, the Court in Johnson deemed an affidavit too conclusory to have
been useful for purposes of establishing probable cause for a warrant. The affidavit at
issue recited that the defendant's landlord had observed "suspicious plants" in the
defendant's apartment. Johnson, 110 ldaho at 527,716 P.2d at 1299. The Court noted
that there was no information contained in the affidavit as to why the plants were
characterized as "suspicious" by the landlord, and therefore the court lacked evidence
by which to determine whether the landlord had a proper basis of knowledge to support
his conclusions. Id. There also was no description of the plants that would have
permitted the court to evaluate for itself whether the plants were suspicious. Id.
In this case, the affidavits supplied by the State were similarly too conclusory in
nature to have had evidentiary value for the district court, and therefore cannot support
a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that, "the various stores are the true

owners of the property based upon the affidavits of the loss prevention officers." (35555
R., p.30.) The sum total of the information provided in the affidavits supplied by the
State is as follows: (1) the name of the affiant; (2) the store that employed the affiant
and the nature of that employment; (3) that the affiant was contacted by the Boise
Police Department and the date of that contact; (4) that the affiant visually inspected the
property; and (5) that the affiant identified the property listed on the attached invoices as
being stolen from the affiant's store "in August, 2006, as part of a refund scheme."
(Affidavit of Josh Toulouse, pp.1-2; Affidavit of Victor Rodriquez, pp.1-2; Affidavit of
Stewart Reynolds, pp.1-2.) These affidavits are nearly identical, and use the exact
same pro forma terminology, with the only meaningful distinction between them being
the names of the affiant, the store who employs them, and what pages of the police
invoice are attached to the affidavit. (Affidavit of Josh Toulouse, pp.1-2; Affidavit of
Victor Rodriquez, pp.1-2; Affidavit of Stewart Reynolds, pp.1-2.)
There is nothing in the affidavits that provides the basis for each of these
individuals' conclusion that the property they inspected came from their store. (Affidavit
of Josh Toulouse, pp.1-2; Affidavit of Victor Rodriquez, pp.1-2; Affidavit of Stewart
Reynolds, pp.1-2.) There is likewise nothing in the affidavits, or any other evidence in
this case, that provides a factual basis for the bald assertion that this property had been
stolen, "in August, 2006, as part of a refund scheme." (Affidavit of Josh Toulouse, pp.12; Affidavit of Victor Rodriquez, pp.1-2; Affidavit of Stewart Reynolds, pp.1-2.) In short,

there is a complete and utter absence of any concrete, factual particulars within these
affidavits that could support the district court's finding that these affidavits proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that "the various stores are the true owners of the

personal property," that is at issue in this appeal. See Johnson, 110 Idaho at 527, 716
P.2d at 1299. (35555 R., p.30.) Instead, the district court merely ratified the conclusory
assertions of the affidavits. See Gafes, 462 U.S. at 239.
Moreover, because the search was executed as a probation search without a
search warrant, there has not even been a finding of probable cause to believe that
Mr. Meier had stolen any property. (4124108 Tr., p.39, L.22 - p.40, L.7.) Mr. Meier
testified unequivocally that the property taken by the police was his own property and no
oneelse's. (4124108Tr., p.9, L.22-p.10, L.16, p.11, Ls.3-5, p.18, L.23-p.19, L.9.)
And, the police invoices themselves list several receipts from purchases from the stores
who had filed affidavits claiming ownership of the property. (35555 R., pp.23-25). As
noted in Mr. Meier's Response in Support of Motion to Return Property, these receipts
likely indicated that Mr. Meier had purchased these items, which is additional proof of
his lawful ownership and right to the return of the property.7 (35555 R., pp.21-22.) In
short, the district court's finding that the various stores where the true owners of the
property was not supported by substantial, competent evidence. As such, the district
court's order denying Mr. Meier's motion for the return of his property was an abuse of
discretion.

While Mr. Meier requested production of these receipts in his Response in Support of
Defendant's Motion to Return Property, there is no indication whether these receipts
were produced. (35555 R., pp.21-22.) In absence of such an indication, Mr. Meier
does not herein raise any issue regarding the withholding these receipts, as the record
makes no indication whether they were or were not ultimately provided to him.

D.

The District Court's Conclusion That The State Was Relieved Of Its Burden Of
Proof Regarding An Adverse Claim Of Ownership To Five Of The Items Omitted
From The Affidavit Of Josh Toulouse On Behalf Of Home Depot Was An Abuse
Of Discretion
Josh Toulouse provided an affidavit on behalf of Home Depot in his capacity as a

loss prevention officer for the store. (See Affidavit of Josh Toulouse, p.1.) The district
court noted, in its order denying Mr. Meier's motion for the return of his property, that
the affidavit provided by Josh Toulouse on behalf of Home Depot (hereinafter, Toulouse
affidavit) omitted any claim of ownership to five items that were listed on the police
inventory forms.

(35555 R., pp.30-31.)

While the Toulouse affidavit recites that

Mr. Toulouse "visually inspected and identified twenty-nine (29) items listed on the
attached three pages of property invoices and determined that they had been stolen
from the Home Depot, in August 2006, as part of a refund scheme," the district court
page of the material attached to the Toulouse affidavit lists five
found that, "the llth
items of property which were not mentioned in the body of the affidavit."

(35555

R., p.30; Affidavit of Josh Toulouse, p.2.) The district court then found that there were
"actually 34 items listed on the final three pages, and that, "[tlhose five items listed on
the third to the last page of the material attached to the affidavit appeared to have been
inadvertently skipped over by the affiant." (35555 R., p.30.) But, because the Toulouse
affidavit mentioned "three pages of invoices," the district court found that the affiant
meant to testify as to ownership of all 34 items in the final pages of the affidavit. (35555
R.; pp.30-31.) The district court then excused the State from any further obligation in
providing proof of any adverse claim of ownership in the five outstanding items. (35555

R.,pp.30-31.)

There are two reasons why the district court's actions were in error. First, and
most important, there are actually four additional pages of items listed on the police
inventory, and not three. (Affidavit of Josh Toulouse, pp.12-15.) The Toulouse affidavit
initially recites that he inspected and identified 81 items on the first nine pages of the
attached inventory sheets as being property stolen from his store. (Affidavit of Josh
Toulouse, p.1.) A review of the initial nine pages of inventory attached to this affidavit
indicates 81 items listed. (Affidavit of Josh Toulouse, pp.3-1I.) But, there are four, and
not three, additional pages of inventory that follow the initial nine. (Affidavit of Josh
Toulouse, pp. 12-15.)
The Toulouse affidavit only asserts that Mr. Toulouse, "visually inspected and
identified twenty nine (29) items listed on the attached three pages of property invoices,"
in conjunction with his claim that these items were stolen from his store. (Affidavit of
Josh Toulouse, p.2.) The first of the remaining four pages indicates items that are
numbered one through ten, consecutively. (Affidavit of Josh Toulouse, p.12.) The third
and fourth pages indicate items numbered eleven through twenty, and twenty-one
through twenty-nine, respectively. (Affidavit of Josh Toulouse, pp.14-15.) However, the
second page of the last four pages of inventory attached to the Toulouse affidavit lists
five items that are not claimed anywhere within the affidavit submitted by Mr. Touiouse.
(Affidavit of Josh Toulouse, p.13.) It is apparent, given the consecutive numbering of
the items from one through twenty-nine, that the Toulouse affidavit is only referencing
the first, third, and fourth pages of the final four pages of attached inventory. (Affidavit
of Josh Toulouse, pp.2, 12, 14-15.) The second page, with five items listed on the
inventory sheet, is omitted in its entirety from Mr. Toulouse's affidavit claiming a right to

return of some of the items taken from Mr. Meier as stolen property. (Affidavit of Josh
Toulouse, pp.1-2, 13.)
It is also worth noting that the inventory forms attached to the Toulouse affidavit
only provide enough space to list ten items on each page. (Affidavit of Josh Toulouse,
pp. 3-15.) In light of this, it would be impossible for three pages of this form to contain
34 items, as was found by the district court. (35555 R., p.30.) As such, the district
court's finding that there were "actually 34 items of property listed on the final three
pages," and that therefore Mr. Toulouse had implicitly claimed ownership to all of the
items indicated on the attached inventory sheets, was clearly erroneous.

(35555

R., p.30.)
Second, the district court's ruling was in contravention of the applicable legal
standards that place the burden of proof on the State to establish that the defendant is
not entitled to lawful possession. Marfinson, 809 F.2d at 1369. The district court's
finding that the State did not have to establish any adverse claim of ownership to the
five items that were omitted from the Toulouse affidavit was based upon a clearly
erroneous finding of fact, and was further against clearly applicable legal standards. As
such, this conclusion was an abuse of the district court's discretion.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Meier respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order
denying Mr. Meier's motion for return of property, and remand this case for further
proceedings.
DATED this 14'~day of May, 2009.
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